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THE FULL STORY OF 
UNITED STATES V. SMITH,  
AMERICA’S MOST IMPORTANT PIRACY 
CASE 
Joel H. Samuels* 
INTRODUCTION 
Many readers would be surprised to learn that a little-
explored nineteenth-century piracy case continues to spawn core 
arguments in modern-day civil cases for damages ranging from 
environmental degradation in Latin America to apartheid-era 
investment in South Africa, as well as criminal trials of foreign 
terrorists.1 That case, United States v. Smith,2 decided by the United 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Deputy Director, Rule of Law Collaborative, 
University of South Carolina School of Law. For invaluable assistance with this 
article, thanks to William McKinney, Dr. Michael Mounter, Kimberly Porter, 
Carolyn Russell, and Katie Stanton. Any shortcomings are the responsibility of the 
author alone. 
1 See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 239, 249-50 (2d 
Cir. 2003); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009); United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1269-70 (A.C.M.R. 2011); 
United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 560 (E.D. Va. 2010); United States v. 
Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. Va. 2010). A multitude of private civil cases have 
relied heavily on Smith, infra note 2, in large measure as a result of the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS), which was contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Many of the 
modern ATS cases have directly analogized the alleged crimes in dispute to piracy 
and those analogies have helped to persuade courts to assert jurisdiction over 
disputes with no connection to the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The statute 
reads in its entirety: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.” The ATS has been modified several times since the 
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States Supreme Court in 1820 on appeal from a Circuit Court 
decision in a trial presided over by Chief Justice John Marshall, offers 
a unique window into a formative period in American law. For all its 
modern-day implications, however, that case was both a product and 
a mirror of its time. 
The full story—as will be discussed further in Part II—is 
complicated, involving multiple ships, multiple parties, multiple 
versions of events, and (by the end of the tale) all strata of society—
from pressed seamen to leading citizens of Baltimore and Richmond 
to the President of the United States and his cabinet members. The 
jury called to serve on the Smith case in July of 1819, however, heard 
relatively straightforward testimony. They heard, that is, about what 
began as a mutiny on board one vessel (the Creola), turned 
immediately to an attack on another (the Irresistible), and culminated 
in further attacks on a number of others while the crew sailed back to 
Baltimore, the home port for many of the accused. The jury could 
not deliver a final verdict about those facts, however, because they had 
no answer for a single legal question: What was the definition of 
piracy? With the judges split on this question, the jury rendered a 
special verdict: 
If the plunder and robbery [that the jury had found] 
be piracy under the act of the Congress of the United 
States, entitled, ‘An act to protect the commerce of 
the United States, and punish crime of piracy,’ then 
we find the said prisoner guilty; if the plunder and 
robbery, above stated, be not piracy under the said act 
of Congress, then we find him, not guilty.3 
In a still-small and evolving America, the case involved many 
of the leading legal minds of the day. Chief Justice Marshall, riding 
                                                 
first Congress passed its original version as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which 
provided that the new federal district courts “shall also have cognizance, 
concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case 
may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 
77 (1789). 
2 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161-62 (1820). 
3 Id. at 153. 
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circuit, was one of two judges sitting as the judges of first instance (in 
the circuit court). William Wirt, the longest serving U.S. Attorney 
General and a man often credited with giving meaningful power to 
that position, argued on behalf of the United States before the 
Supreme Court. Daniel Webster represented the accused pirates on 
appeal. And Justice Joseph Story authored the opinion that rejected 
that appeal and established several important legal baselines for 
future development. 
Smith has had a profound effect on the development of 
international law in the United States;4 it is for this very reason that 
so many cases in so many different areas all reach back to Smith in 
order to understand how domestic law should treat international, 
and, in particular, customary international law. But in spite of its 
importance, the circumstances of the Smith case have never been fully 
studied. 
The case still resonates today, not only for its profound 
impact on legal developments in the nearly two centuries since the 
case ended but also for the multitude of other important issues of the 
day raised by the case, including the role of the press, prison 
conditions, the purpose of different forms of punishment and the 
power of religion to rehabilitate wrongdoers. The convergence of 
many of these issues can be seen in an excerpt from an editorial 
about the case in one of the leading newspapers of the day: 
We have taken some little pains to report these cases 
to the public. The scenes of outrages on the high seas 
which they devolope [sic], belong to the history of the 
times. Such scenes ought to be understood. To 
repress them, should be the wish of every American, 
who values his country, her character and her 
laws. We owe it to the civilized world to arrest such 
lawless outrages, perpetrated by vessels and by crews 
                                                 
4 For a fuller discussion on the role of piracy cases (including Smith) in 
the formation of the relationship between international law and domestic law in the 
United States, see Joel H. Samuels, Troubled Waters: How Piracy Has Shaped the 
Relationship Between American Law and International Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1231 
(2010). 
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who have their equipment and their sanctuary in our 
ports. If the law be so weak that pirates can escape 
through its meshes, let us strengthen it. Let congress 
do their duty, and not leave it to judges and juries to 
do it for them. If the law then be undefined in its 
provisions, let them give clearer and more practical 
definitions.5 
The men involved in the events leading up to the piracy trial 
held in Richmond, Virginia in July 1819 were all crewmembers of 
vessels involved in the intricate world of maritime operations in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In its first fifty years, as the 
United States was forging an identity, piracy was a central issue for all 
maritime nations. As such, to understand the chaos on the high seas 
at the time of the formation of the Republic, it is important to 
understand the way that states enforced their maritime power. 
Today, maritime powers have large naval forces.6 Even 
smaller littoral states invest in navy vessels to protect the waters 
within their maritime boundaries, if not beyond them.7 In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, national navies of even 
the strongest maritime states were small.8 Instead, littoral states—
                                                 
5 Law Intelligence: Crew of the Irresistible, 16 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Baltimore, 
MD) Aug. 7, 1819, at 395 [hereinafter NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819)]. 
6 For example, in 2005, the United States Navy was estimated to have 
slightly more than 325,000 active naval troops and 522 naval vessels of various 
kinds, while China was estimated to have 250,000-plus naval troops and 965 naval 
vessels. See INT’L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012, at 
57-58, 235-36 (2012) [hereinafter MILITARY BALANCE 2012]. The United Kingdom, 
one of the key naval powers of the eighteenth century, was estimated to employ 
nearly 35,000 naval troops with 111 vessels. Id. at 170. Notably, the U.K.’s naval 
forces had dropped significantly in less than a decade, as those same forces had 
been estimated at more than 50,000 people and 152 vessels as recently as 2005. See 
INT’L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE 2005, at 101-02 
(2005). 
7 In 2012, Vietnam had 40,000 members of its naval forces and 140 
vessels. At the same time, Ghana, along Africa’s west coast, had 2,000 individuals 
and seven vessels, while Qatar in the Middle East had 1,800 individuals and 22 
vessels in its navy. See MILITARY BALANCE 2012, supra note 6, at 292-93, 437, 345.  
8 As one author has noted, “at the start of the American Revolution the 
Continental Navy consisted of just thirty-one ships having a total of 1,242 guns. 
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strong and weak alike—relied on private vessels for maritime 
support.9 Those private vessels, known as privateers, were invested 
with power to act on behalf of a state through letters of marque and 
reprisal.10 Instead of oceans policed by national navies, private vessels 
and their captains sailed their vessels on behalf of states.11 Thus a 
vessel that had been private one day might carry a letter of marque 
the next. Once the term of the letter expired, that vessel might return 
to its prior private activities or it might renew the letter and continue 
in the service of the territory whose letter it had carried.12 Or, under a 
third option, the vessel captain or owner might choose to accept a 
                                                 
The real maritime force of the colonies was its fleet of over 800 privateers sailing 
under 1700 letters of marque issued on a per voyage basis.” Rod Sullivan, A 
Constitutional Approach to Maritime Personal Injury Law, 43 J. MAR. L. & COM. 393, 407-
08 (2012) (internal citations omitted).  
9 See, e.g., Letter from Elbridge Gerry to John Adams (Dec. 4, 1775) in 3-
4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS: MAY 1775-AUGUST 1776, at 349-50 (Robert J. Taylor et 
al. eds., 1977) (congratulating Adams on “the Success of the Continental 
privateers” and discussing “the growing ranks of such vessels fitt[ed] out by Private 
Persons”).  
10 See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal 
Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 210-12 (2004). In the United 
States, the power to vest private vessels with state authority is contained in the 
Constitution, where Congress is authorized to “grant Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. For a discussion of the history of 
privateering, see also JANICE E. THOMSON, MERCENARIES, PIRATES, AND 
SOVEREIGNS 26 (1996); Daphné Richemond-Barak, Rethinking Private Warfare, 5 
LAW & ETHICS HUMAN RIGHTS 159, 163 (2011). 
11 By way of reference, while the Continental armies at the time of the 
Revolutionary War numbered about 11,000, in the same year there were 11,000 
seamen serving as privateers in the Atlantic and Caribbean oceans. The Continental 
Navy and privateers captured 16,000 British prisoners and confiscated massive 
amounts of gunpowder and other cargo. See generally ROBERT H. PATTON, PATRIOT 
PIRATES: THE PRIVATEER WAR FOR FREEDOM AND FORTUNE IN THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (2008). See also Sullivan, supra note 8 at 408. 
12 For discussion of the chaos that often reigned as a result of confusion 
over vessels after losing the sanction of the state, see Lawrence Azubuike, 
International Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 43, 43-46 
(2009).  See also Matthew C. Houghton, Comment: Walking the Plank: How the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1816, While Progressive, Fails to Provide a Comprehensive 
Solution to Somali Piracy, 16 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 253, 271 (2009).  
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letter of marque from another territory, thus shifting the vessel’s 
allegiance overnight.13 
The existence of shifting, largely private naval forces created 
chaos in itself.14 In addition, the power of private vessels opened the 
door for pirates—acting under the authority of no state. In a relative 
vacuum of power, private vessels carrying letters of marque were 
loathe to take on powerful pirates, where the risk was high and the 
potential benefit low. Moreover, the very fact that private vessels 
could be empowered through the marque and reprisal system opened 
another opportunity for pirates—to feign letters and thus falsely 
legitimize piratical acts.15 Indeed, much of this played into what one 
author has described as the “cycle of piracy.”16 
                                                 
13 See infra note 68 (describing how Captain Daniels discarded one letter 
of marque for another on board the Irresistible). 
14 By the mid-nineteenth century, privateering had become such a force 
of maritime operations and had wreaked so much havoc on the seas that the major 
maritime nations of the day met in Paris and signed an agreement abolishing it. See 
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Gr. Brit.-
Austria-Fr.-Pruss.-Russ.-Sardinia-Turk., Apr. 16, 1856, http://www.icrc.org/ihl. 
nsf/INTRO/105?OpenDocument. Fifty years later, in 1907, the responsibility of 
states with respect to privateering was clarified as part of a new treaty mandating, 
among other things, that non-military vessels converted into military vessels be 
under the immediate command of a sovereign government in order for the crew 
not to be considered pirates. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Convention (XIII) 
Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/240. 
15 For an account of ways that privateers negotiated and used letters of 
marque to their advantage, see LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: 
LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES 1400-1900, at 112-18 (2010). 
16 See J.L. Anderson, Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective on 
Maritime Predation, 6 J. WORLD HISTORY 175, 183-184 (1995). Anderson described 
the cycle as follows:  
[P]iracy is initially conducted by small and independent groups 
of individuals using their boats for piracy as desperation of 
poverty dictates or as the opportunity presents. Success in this 
venture equips the groups with more and larger vessels, and an 
organization can emerge to coordinate their activities, these 
changes making predation increasingly effective. With further 
success the pirates’ strength becomes such as to make them a 
virtually independent power, when they may choose to enter into 
an alliance with some recognized state. At that point the pirates 
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Thomas Smith and his shipmates aboard the Irresistible were 
part of this cycle of piracy and the confusion that grew out of the 
thin line between pirates and privateers. This article will explore their 
predicament by tracing the development of the law leading up to the 
Smith decision and will provide the most complete account to date of 
the circumstances of the case and its immediate aftermath. Part I of 
this article will lay out the development of the law on piracy in the 
United States in the years before Smith and his crewmates were 
brought to trial in Richmond, Virginia. Part II will present the story 
of the acts for which the men were brought to trial in 1819 as well as 
the details of the trial itself. In addition, this part will look into the 
events that occurred in the months that followed the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith in 1820, focusing in particular on the 
interactions related to the case behind the scenes at the highest 
reaches of government. Part III concludes by reviewing the notable 
aspects of the case and by discussing the implications of Smith today. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PIRACY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
LEADING UP TO THE INDICTMENTS AGAINST THOMAS SMITH 
As the American Republic was taking shape, the framers of 
the Constitution were keenly aware of the problems of piracy.17 
Initially, the colonial states themselves had been responsible for 
developing their own laws on piracy. But after gaining independence 
from Britain, the federal legislature sought to develop a unified 
national plan for combating it.18 
                                                 
have become in effect a mercenary navy, paid by plunder. 
Success will legitimize their power; failure and defeat will lead to 
disintegration of the organization into the small, furtive outlaw 
groups from which the force originated.  
17 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).   
18 Article 9 Section 1 of the Articles of Confederation, approved for 
ratification in 1777 and officially ratified by the states in 1781, provided that 
Congress was to “have the sole and exclusive right . . . [and] States shall be 
restrained from . . . appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies 
committed on the high seas and establishing courts for receiving and determining 
finally appeals in all cases of captures . . . .” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 
1781, art. IX, para. 1. 
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Pursuant to Article 9 of the Articles of Confederation, on 
March 17, 1781, a congressional “committee [was] appointed to 
devise and report the mode of appointing courts for the trial of 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas . . . .”19 Three weeks 
later, the committee had completed a draft of a bill to establish courts 
for the trial of piracy, and Congress agreed to an Ordinance outlining 
the procedures for creating such courts.20 Under the Ordinance, any 
person who committed piracy or a felony on the high seas would be 
tried according to common law courts as if the piracy or felony had 
been committed on land. The Ordinance provided that these cases 
were to be judged by “the justices of the supreme or superior court 
of judicature, and judge of the court of admiralty of the . . . states.”21 
After a report to Congress on February 4, 1783 explaining 
that the Legislature of Pennsylvania found the piracy courts 
Ordinance to be so obscure “that they were at a loss to adapt their 
laws to it,” a committee was appointed to amend the Ordinance.22 
The amended version passed on March 4, 1783, clarifying which 
judges were to preside over the court.23 
                                                 
19 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 354 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912). 
20 Id. at 354–56. 
21 Id. A letter by one of the Ordinance’s drafters, penned less than a week 
after it had been completed, explained how the piracy courts were expected to 
operate, noting that: 
Congress have determined that the superior Judges in each State 
with the Judge of Admiralty (or such one of the Judges of 
Admiralty where there are several as the Executive shall chuse to 
commissionate) shall be Judges for trying Piracies on the high 
Seas; any two or more to be a Quorum. The Tryals were to be 
under all the Forms of prosecuting such Crimes on Land by 
grand & petit Juries.   
Letter from James Lovell to Elbridge Gerry (Apr. 10, 1781), in 17 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 427-432 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1990). 
22 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 888–89 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922). 
23 Id. at 164.  The following language was removed: “the Judge of the 
Court of Admiralty, or, in case there shall be several judges of the said court in the 
state where the trials hereafter mentioned are to be had, any one of such judges, to 
be commissioned for that purpose by the supreme executive power of such State, 
and the justices of the supreme or superior court of judicature of the several and 
 2012 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 1:2 
328 
Nonetheless, it appears that there were continued 
imperfections with Congress’ approach to mandating that the states 
try piracy under their common law. On September 6, 1785, South 
Carolina delegate Charles Pinckney24 made a motion before Congress 
expressing the opinion that “similar crimes should be punished in a 
similar manner,” and that the “Ordinance of April, 1781, respecting 
the punishment of piracies and felonies has a different operation in 
some of the States.”25 On Pinckney’s recommendation, on September 
6, 1785, a resolution was made directing John Jay, the Secretary of the 
United States for the Department of Foreign Affairs, to institute 
courts that would punish piracy and felonies committed on the high 
seas in the same manner in all the states.26 The motion notes that at 
that point in time, different states punished piracy differently per 
their interpretations of the 1781 ordinance.27 The September 6, 1785 
resolution underscores the importance of legislating against piracy 
and states that it “has been the policy of all civilized nations to 
punish crimes so dangerous to the welfare and destructive to the 
intercourse and Confidence of Society in an exemplary manner.”28 
In response to that resolution, the Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs reported back to the Congress on September 29, 1785.29 
While the Secretary agreed that “Piracy is War against all mankind, 
which is the highest Violation of the Laws of Nations. . .,” he argued 
that Congress did not in fact have the power “to declare what is or 
shall be Felony or Piracy . . . but merely to appoint Courts for the 
Trial of Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.”30 
                                                 
respective states, or any two, or more, of them, (of whom the said Judge of the 
Admiralty shall always be one).”  Id.   
24 A committee that included Pinckney drafted Article 19, an amendment 
to the Articles of Confederation that would have created a federal court to handle 
cases of treason, misprision of treason, and piracy or felony on the high seas, and 
put it before Congress on August 7, 1786. 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS 1786, at 494-98 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1934). 
25 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1785, at 682 (John C. 
Fitzpatrick ed., 1933).   
26 Id. at 682, 797-806. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 797. 
30 Id. 
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Nevertheless, the Secretary reasoned “that Congress would not 
exceed their Powers by ordaining, the Punishment to be inflicted 
throughout the United States in Cases of Piracy,” and proceeded to 
lay out an exceedingly detailed “Ordinance for the Trial of Piracies 
and Felonies Committed on the High Seas” to replace the 1781 
Ordinance.31 Ultimately, Jay’s draft ordinance was not passed, and no 
action appears to have been taken on the proposed amendment.32 
Several states followed the Congressional mandate laid out in 
the 1781 Piracy Ordinance. Massachusetts, for one, established piracy 
courts in 1783 in response to the Ordinance.33 The Massachusetts 
Act was entitled “An Act for Carrying into Execution an Ordinance 
of Congress for Establishing Courts for the Trial of Felonies and 
Piracies Committed on the High Seas.”34 
At its October 1786 session, the Virginia General Assembly 
passed “An act concerning treasons, felonies, and other offences 
committed out of the jurisdiction of this commonwealth.”35 This act 
gave the general courts of Virginia counties the authority to try cases 
of treason and other felonies, “except piracies and felonies on the 
high seas,” which were committed “by any citizen of this 
commonwealth, in any place out of the jurisdiction of the courts of 
common law in this commonwealth, and all felonies committed by 
                                                 
31 Id. at 798–804. 
32 Letter from Charles Thomson to William Samuel Johnson (May 16, 
1789), in 25 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 525-26 (Paul 
Hubert Smith et al. eds., 1976). 
33 1783 Mass. Acts, ch. 45, 116-18, reprinted in 1782-3 ACTS AND 
RESOLVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 116–18 (Boston, Wright & Potter 1890). 
Massachusetts had established its first maritime court as early as 1775 to exercise 
jurisdiction in prize matters. THE LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 353 (L. Kinvin 
Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel, eds., 1965). Several years after establishing the 1783 
court, Massachusetts passed a resolution dealing with the fate of two pirates who 
had been found guilty of piracy and faced a death sentence. See “Resolve on the 
Petition of Richard Squire and John Matthews, Authorizing the Justices of the 
Court Appointed for the Trial of Piracies and Felonies on the High Seas, to 
Sentence Said Convicts to Hard Labour, and not to Pass Sentence of Death,” 
reprinted in ACTS AND RESOLVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 882 (Boston, Wright & 
Potter 1890). 
34 1783 Mass. Acts, ch. 45, 116-18, supra note 33. 
35 1786 Va. Acts, ch. XLVI 330. 
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citizen against citizen in any such place.” This act, coupled with the 
1785 acts of the Virginia legislature confirmed that cases of piracy on 
the high seas would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty 
courts. 
In 1787, New York enacted legislation to clarify the role of its 
courts of admiralty.36 The New York Act was designed to make clear 
“that the court of admiralty of this State shall not meddle or hold 
plea of any thing done within this State, but only of things done upon 
the sea, as it hath formerly been used,” but “nevertheless of the death 
of any person and of maihem [sic] done in ships or vessels being and 
hovering in the main stream of great rivers out of the body of any 
county, or nigh to the sea, and in none other places of the same 
rivers, the court of admiralty shall have cognizance.” 
Such was the importance of piracy to the framers of the 
Constitution that Article 1 Section 8 explicitly provides Congress 
with the power “to define and punish Piracies and Felonies 
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of 
Nations.”37 The First Congress under the Constitution drafted the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, which, among other things, established the 
power and composition of courts at all levels of the federal system.38 
A primary goal of this portion of the act was to clarify the role of 
federal courts vis à vis state courts, in particular with regard to cases 
where conflicts had arisen, including cases involving piracy. Under 
                                                 
36 See ACT TO PREVENT ENCROACHMENTS OF THE COURT OF 
ADMIRALTY (1787), reprinted in NEW YORK STATE, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK, PASSED AT THE SESSIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE HELD IN THE YEARS 1785, 
1786, 1787 AND 1788, INCLUSIVE, BEING THE EIGHTH, NINTH, TENTH AND 
ELEVENTH SESSIONS, REPUBLISHED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, PURSUANT TO 
CHAPTER THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-ONE OF THE LAWS OF EIGHTEEN 
HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIVE 394 (1886). 
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  See Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and 
Punish” Clause and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 149 (2009) 
(discussing the scope and role of this clause).  
38 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).  See generally Alison LaCroix, 
Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 205 (2012). 
Chapter 20, §§ 3, 4, of the Act explicitly enumerates the powers of the federal 
courts at all levels.  The Judiciary Act divided the courts into thirteen judicial 
districts and three circuits. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal 
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923). 
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the Judiciary Act, circuit courts were established to hear appeals from 
cases of the district court as well as certain cases with direct recourse 
to the circuit court.39 Circuit court panels were to be made up of two 
Supreme Court justices and one district court judge (though a 
quorum existed if any two of those three were present), so long as 
any appeal being heard did not involve a decision by the district judge 
on the panel.40 
In terms of maritime jurisdiction, the circuit and district 
courts had jurisdiction depending on the extent of punishment. The 
district court had exclusive jurisdiction for 
crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the 
authority of the United States, committed within their 
respective districts, or upon the high seas; where no 
other punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty 
stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or a 
term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, is to 
be inflicted . . . .41 
Circuit courts had jurisdiction when the punishment was greater—
i.e., over “all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of 
the United States, except where this act otherwise provides . . . .”42  
With regard to piracy, then, circuit courts had exclusive jurisdiction 
given that the punishment at the time was death.43 
In 1801, Congress passed an act, pressed by President John 
Adams at the end of his term, that had the effect of reducing the 
scope of the judiciary. Among other things, this Act reduced the 
number of Supreme Court justices and eliminated the requirement 
that the justices ride circuit.44 
                                                 
39 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
40 Id. § 4.  See Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road: The Supreme Court and 
the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753 (2003) (describing circuit 
riding by the justices of the Supreme Court).  
41 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
42 Id. 
43 See Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, 5 Stat. 510 (1819). 
44 See Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 Stat. 89 (1801). 
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The next year, with Adams out of office and Thomas 
Jefferson in his place, that Act was repealed45 and replaced by new 
legislation revising both the 1789 and 1801 Acts.46 These revisions 
included an expansion of the number of circuit courts to six, with the 
Chief Justice assigned to the fifth circuit, which covered Virginia and 
North Carolina.47 The Act also contained an unusual provision (later 
relevant in the Smith case), namely that: 
whenever any question shall occur before a circuit 
court, upon which the opinions of the judges shall be 
opposed, the point upon which the disagreement shall 
happen, shall, during the same term, upon the request 
of either party, or their counsel, be stated under the 
direction of the judges, and certified under the seal of 
the court, to the supreme court, at their next session 
to be held thereafter; and shall, by the said court, be 
finally decided.48 
The first Congressional legislation to focus specifically on 
piracy was contained in the 1790 Act for the Punishment of Certain 
Crimes Against the United States.49 The Act covered, among other 
things, murder and robbery on the high seas, finding that they would 
be punishable by death if those same acts committed on land “would 
by the laws of the United States be punishable by death.”50 The Act 
represented an effort both to bring harmony to the prosecution of 
pirates and to lay out the standard for identifying who could be 
                                                 
45 Judiciary Act of 1802, 2 Stat. 132 (1802). 
46 See Judiciary Act of 1802, 2 Stat. 156 (1802) (establishing that the 
function of the federal courts was contained in the pertinent sections of Chapter 31 
of the 1802 Act).  See also Alison LaCroix, The New Wheel in the Federal Machine: From 
Sovereignty to Jurisdiction in the Early Republic, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 345 (2007) 
(providing a thorough treatment of the nation’s first judiciary acts) 
47 See Judiciary Act of 1802, ch. 31, § 5, 2 Stat. 156 (1802). 
48 Id. § 6 
49 See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112 (1790). 
50 Id. at 113. 
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punished with death for acts that occurred on the high seas, i.e., in 
territory belonging to no state.51 
In the first federal court decision to meaningfully grapple 
with the 1790 statute, a district court judge in Massachusetts 
discussed whether force was necessary as an element of the crime of 
piracy.52 Two American crewmen were charged with piracy after 
running away with a ship and ending up in St. Lucia.53 The court 
reasoned that, according to the law of nations, “[a] pirate is one . . . , 
who, to enrich himself, either by surprise or force, sets upon 
merchants or other traders, by sea, to spoil them of their 
goods. . . .”54 However, the court found that “[p]iracy, by the 
common law, consists in committing those acts of robbery and 
depredation upon the high seas, which, if committed on shore, would 
amount to felony there.”55 The court went on to conclude that the 
statute, while “analogous to the common law description, . . . ma[d]e 
certain other acts piracy, which would not be so at common law,” 
including breach of trust committed “piratically and feloniously.”56 In 
other words, the court acknowledged that the statute expanded the 
crime of piracy beyond the common law definition, which 
corresponded with piracy as understood by the law of nations. 
The Massachusetts district court’s opinion in Tully foretold a 
debate that would be litigated in the federal courts over the next 
several years—the scope of the 1790 Act and the manner in which 
Congress had exercised its Constitutional prerogative to define and 
punish piracy. In its first decision addressing piracy, the Supreme 
Court took a narrow view of piracy and the scope of the Act.57 In 
                                                 
51 See ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 128-37 (1988) (detailing a 
thorough review of the legislative history of the 1790 Act). 
52 See United States v. Tully, 28 F. Cas. 226 (C.C. Mass. 1812).  
53 See id. at 228. 
54 Id. at 229. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
57 United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610 (1818).  See also Act of Apr. 30, 
1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112 (1790). In this Act by the First Congress, piracy was 
defined as the commission of certain acts, prohibited by domestic laws that occur 
“upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, bason, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of 
any particular state,” id. These prohibited acts include “murder or robbery, or any 
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United States v. Palmer, Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated 
that “the crime of robbery, committed by a person on the high seas, 
on board of any ship . . . belonging exclusively to subjects of a 
foreign state . . . is not piracy within the true intent and meaning of 
the act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United 
States.”58 According to this reasoning, the Court found that because 
the crime of robbery was not punishable by death on land, robbery 
committed on the high seas was likewise not punishable by death.59 
Congress acted swiftly to respond to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Palmer. On March 3, 1819, Congress enacted legislation 
regarding the prohibition of piracy, but it defined piracy differently 
than it had in the 1790 Act.60 The 1819 Act to Protect the Commerce 
of the United States, and Punish the Crime of Piracy set forth that 
“any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas, commit 
the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations . . . shall, upon 
conviction therof [sic] . . . be punished with death.”61 The reference 
to the law of nations reflected a willingness by American lawmakers 
to incorporate international law into domestic law.62 
                                                 
other offence, which, if committed within the body of a county, would, by the laws 
of the United States, be punishable with death,” id. The Act further lists scenarios 
that would qualify as piratical acts under the legislation, such as the revolt of 
seamen against their captain or the voluntary yielding of a vessel to pirates, id. For a 
comprehensive discussion of piracy as a window into the Marshall Court’s 
jurisprudence, see G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International Law: The 
Piracy Cases, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 727 (1989).  
58 Palmer, 16 U.S. at 633–34. 
59 Id. at 636. 
60 Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510 (1819).  
61 Id.  
62 Thomas Jefferson recognized that “[t]he Law of Nations, by which [a] 
question is to be determined, is composed of three branches. 1. the Moral law of 
our nature. 2. the Usages of nations. 3. their special Conventions.” 25 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 609 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1992). In a letter to Thomas 
Jefferson, Edmund Randolph stated that “[t]he law of nations, tho’ not specially 
adapted by the constitution, or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of 
the land.” Letter from Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson (June 26, 1792), in 
24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 127 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1990). 
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The legislative history for the 1819 Act is sparse, but Edwin 
Dickinson, writing in the Harvard Law Review a century after the Act, 
wrote that: 
From [Palmer] it was only natural to infer that the 
Supreme Court regarded Section 8 as exclusively a 
statutory definition of piracy by the municipal law of 
the United States, not including provisions for the 
trial and punishment in United States courts of pirates 
by the law of nations.  
Thus interpreted, however, the decision in United 
States v. Palmer would have limited much the scope 
and efficacy of this section. The decision was not well 
received. That it left the law with respect to piracy 
more restricted than it had been supposed to be was 
made evident when Congress promptly enacted a new 
statute, the Act of March 3, 1819, to supply the 
omission which the Supreme Court had discovered.63 
This was the state of the law on piracy when the crew of the Creola 
made the fateful decision off the island of Margarita that eventually 
led to their arrest and trial in the United States. 
II. THE TRIALS OF THOMAS SMITH AND HIS SHIPMATES 
A. The Alleged Acts of Piracy 
The story of Thomas Smith and his shipmates is not a typical 
tale of marauding pirates.64 Certainly the men attacked, boarded, and 
robbed a number of vessels during a relatively short cruise in 1819, 
                                                 
63 Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 
334, 345 (1925) (internal citations omitted). 
64 Although Thomas Smith was the named defendant in the case before 
the Supreme Court, he was not the most important figure onboard either ship. In 
fact, he was the servant to Captain Paul, the captain of the Creola, the vessel on 
which most of the accused pirates originally served. Crew of the Irresistible, CITY 
GAZETTE AND COMMERCIAL DAILY ADVERTISER (Charleston, SC), Aug. 5, 1819, 
at 2 [hereinafter Crew of the Irresistible (Aug. 5, 1819)]. 
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flying a variety of flags in order to dupe their victims into coming 
closer. But—as discussed fully below—the voyage grew out of the 
war for independence in South America; there was no buried treasure 
(indeed, the take was minimal); the men seem to have committed no 
assaults once the ships had been taken; and they apparently respected 
their victims’ nationality, taking more from vessels of Spanish origin 
and less from those sailing under, for example, an American flag. 
The story begins with two vessels, the Creola and the 
Irresistible.65 At the relevant time, both vessels carried letters of 
marque. The Creola carried a letter issued by the government of what 
was then known as Buenos Aires, which was engaged in a struggle for 
independence from Spain.66 The Irresistible carried a letter from 
General José Artigas, who led a movement by the United Provinces 
of River Plate—in opposition not only to Spain but also to the 
government of Buenos Aires.67 Notably, the captain of the Irresistible, 
                                                 
65 The vessel itself is spelled “Irresistible” in some sources of the period 
and “Irresistable” in other sources. For the sake of uniformity, this article will refer 
to the ship as the “Irresistible,” except where quoting directly.  This same rule will 
apply to other circumstances, as well, including instances where different spellings 
exist for the Island of Margarita (Margaritta) and Buenos Aires (Buenos Ayres) and 
the men known as Daniels (Danels). 
66 United States v. Chapels, 25 F. Cas. 399 (C.C. Va. 1819); NILES’ WKLY. 
REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 393. (N.B.: The Law Intelligence article repeats 
the case verbatim. Because the journal is paginated and the case is not, all relevant 
citations to testimony will be to the journal and will identify the witness giving 
testimony.) As the Carolina Gazette reported, the Creola was “a private armed vessel 
commissioned by the Government of Buenos Ayres, a Spanish Colony at war with 
Spain . . . .” Crew of the Irresistible, XIX CAROLINA GAZETTE (Charleston, SC), Aug. 
7, 1819, at 4 [hereinafter Crew of the Irresistible (Aug. 7, 1819)]. That ship’s letter of 
marque expressly allowed the vessel to take “property of the subjects of the king of 
Spain,” but not “South American Spanish property.” NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 
1819), supra note 5, at 392 (testimony of John McFadden).  
67 The testimony and articles also indicate that the letter of marque came 
from the “Government of Artigas.” NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 
5.  General Artigas fought against Spain but also in opposition to the government 
of Buenos Aires. JOHN STREET, ARTIGAS AND THE EMANCIPATION OF URUGUAY 
147 (1959) (“[General Artigas] began to work, not for the government of Buenos 
Aires, but wholly for his own people . . . . Artigas was able, after years of struggle, 
to free his native province from dependence on both Spaniards and Portenos.”). The 
disagreement between Artigas and the government of Buenos Aires stemmed in 
large measure from Artigas’ commitment to setting up a federal state modeled on 
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John Daniels, had initially agreed to sail under a letter of marque 
from Buenos Aires before changing his mind on the eve of departure 
and sailing instead under a letter from Artigas.68 Both vessels found at 
                                                 
the United States, including adaptation of the Articles of Confederation, state 
constitutions and the U.S. Constitution itself. The government of Buenos Aires, by 
contrast, wanted a centralized state along the lines of traditional European 
monarchies of the time. See GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM HEARD ROUND THE WORLD, 1776–1989: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 123, 132-34 (2009). Interestingly enough, it appears that General 
Artigas also supplied a letter of marque for the Antelope.  Carol Necole Browne, 
Casting Lots: The Illusion of Justice and Accountability in Property Allocation, 53 BUFF. L. 
REV. 65, 130 (2005) (reprinting Circuit Court case).  
68 The Gran Para, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 471, 471–72 (1822) (In June 1818, 
after the Irresistible “left the port, a commission from General Artigas, as Chief of 
the Oriental Republic, was produced, under which [John D. Daniels] declared that 
he intended to cruize, and [the letter of marquee] granted by the government of 
Buenos Ayres was sent back.”). For a riveting account of Daniels’ adventures, see 
Fred Hopkins, For Flag and Profit: The Life of Commodore John Daniel Danels of Baltimore, 
80 MD. HIST. MAG. 392, 395 (1985). About the competing letters of marque, 
Hopkins explained: 
 After clearing the mouth of the Rio de la Plata, Danels 
mustered his crew and announced that he also had a commission 
from Banda Oriental, modern Uruguay, signed by that country’s 
revolutionary leader Jose Artigas, giving Danels authority to 
attack both Spanish and Portuguese seaborne commerce. 
Bearing letters of marque and reprisal from two separate 
governments was not legal according to international law. Danels 
was later to claim he returned the Buenos Airean commission to 
Buenos Aires via a passing schooner. Officials in Buenos Aires 
claimed never to have received the documents and declared 
Danels a pirate. The exact reasons for Danels’ securing two 
commissions are uncertain. Several possibilities do exist. Recent 
evidence gives the date of the Banda Oriental commission as 14 
February 1818, two months before Danels departed Baltimore. 
By accepting the commission in Baltimore, Danels would have 
been in violation of the Neutrality Act of 1817. The entire affair 
of the Buenos Airean commission may have been an attempt to 
somehow cover Danels’ earlier violation of American law. 
Another possibility is that for some reason Danels wanted a 
Buenos Airean commission more than a Banda Oriental one. 
Banda Oriental was the less stable of the two governments. 
Upon arrival in the Rio de la Plata, Buenos Aires would only give 
commissions against Spanish and not Portuguese shipping. Also 
Buenos Aires at least attempted to exert some control over its 
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least some of their crew members in Baltimore and, in mid- to late 
March of 1819, both came to the island of Margarita, off the coast of 
Venezuela.69 
Although the two vessels were technically enemies, it appears 
that neither of the captains was interested in pursuit of the other. 
                                                 
privateers. This control may have been unwanted and 
unexpected by Danels.  
 After clearing the mouth of the Rio de la Plata and 
announcing the Banda Oriental commission to the crew, Danels 
renamed his vessel La Irresistible, the name which supposedly 
appears on the February 1818 commission. Danels cruised for a 
month and a-half in the western Atlantic. His success among the 
unsuspecting Portuguese merchant vessels was phenomenal as 
he plundered and sunk over twenty-six of them. Specie from 
twenty-four of the vessels totalled $68,000. The Globo, bound 
from Bombay to Lisbon, with a cargo of spices and specie, 
netted Danels $30,000 in specie and a cargo valued at $90,000. 
But his most valuable prize was the Gran Para, Rio de Janeiro to 
Lisbon, with $300,000 in specie. Suddenly, John Danels became 
an international figure. Already his name was better known in 
Lisbon and Madrid than his adopted hometown of Baltimore.  
Id. (internal citations omitted.) 
69 CAROLINA GAZETTE, Apr. 17, 1819, at 471-72 (reprinting article from 
the BALTIMORE AMERICAN, dated Apr. 3, 1819) (announcing that the Irresistible had 
arrived at Margarita on March 16, 1819, “bringing in with her His Catholic 
Majesty’s late brig Nereyda, of 18 guns”); NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra 
note 5, at 391 (testimony of Samuel Stanley); id. at 392 (testimony of John Donald). 
The Island of Margarita, or Margarita Island, is a Venezuelan Island in the 
Caribbean, first discovered by Christopher Columbus in 1498. H. MICHAEL 
TARVER & JULIA C. FREDERICK, THE HISTORY OF VENEZUELA 25–26 (2005). It 
was on that island, famous for its pearls, that Simon Bolivar was commissioned to 
lead the Venezuelan independence movement. See H. L. V. DUCOUDRAY 
HOLSTEIN, MEMOIRS OF SIMON BOLIVAR, PRESIDENT LIBERATOR OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA; AND OF HIS PRINCIPLE GENERALS; SECRET HISTORY OF 
THE REVOLUTION, AND THE EVENTS WHICH PRECEDED IT, FROM 1807 TO THE 
PRESENT TIME 152 (Boston, S. G. Goodrich & Co. 1830) (“On the day of his 
being received as commander-in-chief of the armies of Venezuela and Caracas, in 
the island of Margarita, he published a proclamation, in which he said, ‘he had not 
arrived to conquer, but to protect the country, and that he invited the inhabitants 
of Venezuela to unite and join him, if they would be considered by their Liberators 
as pure and good patriots’”). See also FELIPE LARRAZABAL, THE LIFE OF SIMON 
BOLIVAR; LIBERATOR OF COLOMBIA AND PERU, FATHER OF BOLIVIA 281 (1866); 
TARVER & FREDERICK, supra, at 53–54. 
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Samuel Stanley (“a youth of 18” aboard the Irresistible) stated that 
“[w]e had it in our power to take Buenos Ayrean privateers from 
Baltimore, but we did not attempt it.”70 And according to the 
testimony of John McFadden, first lieutenant of the Creola, the 
officers of that vessel “did not think themselves authorised [sic] to 
take a vessel under the Artigas flag; on the contrary, he had known 
the two flags cruise together.”71 Perhaps not surprisingly, then, some 
of the members of the crew of the Creola must have come into 
contact with Captain Daniels, who led the Irresistible, and with some 
of his crew. 
At this time, it at least appears that the crews of both vessels 
were unhappy. Onboard the Irresistible, the men presumably knew that 
“[t]he Irresistible had been engaged by the governor [of Margaritta] to 
sail to Venezuela in two days.”72 And some of the crewmembers later 
stated “that Daniels, while they were under his command, treated 
them improperly; that he had confined, in the fort at Margarita, three 
of his crew, and who were under sentence of death, in consequence 
of some alledged [sic] disrespect to his person.”73 
The men aboard the Creola were—by all accounts—about to 
be drawn into South America’s bid for independence from Spain. At 
best, as crew member John Donald testified, the Creola had been sold, 
“and they had none [i.e., no ship] to return home in.”74 But James 
                                                 
70 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 391 (testimony of 
Samuel Stanly). 
71 Id. at 392 (testimony of John McFadden). Indeed, in response to a 
question from U.S. Attorney Robert Stanard as to whether the commission from 
Buenos Aires specifically restricted the Creola from taking South American Spanish 
property, McFadden answered in the affirmative, noting that the commission (letter 
of marque) “is against the property of the subjects of the king of Spain.” Id.  
72 Id. at 393 (testimony of Captain Daniels).  See also John Quincy Adams, 
Diary Entry (April 11, 1820), in MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 62, 64 (Charles 
Francis Adams ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1875) (denouncing Captain 
Daniels as “the man who had seduced them [i.e., the crewmembers] to their 
crime”).  
73 CITY GAZETTE AND COMMERCIAL DAILY ADVERTISER (Charleston, 
SC), May 18, 1819, at 1 (reprinting article from unnamed periodical from 
Wilmington, NC dated May 8, 1819). 
74 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 392, 394 (explaining 
that the trial court viewed Creola crewmember John Donald as a credible witness 
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Black—a key figure who later turned state’s evidence in exchange for 
immunity—maintained that the crew had initially been told they 
would cruise for three months but in fact “were carried direct to 
Margaritta as recruits for admiral Brion—being fairly kidnapped. 
When they arrived at that island, bread and water in the dungeons of 
the castle or the yard arm, on the one hand, —and their service to 
Brion, on the other, was tendered to them.”75 His account, although 
perhaps reported in a hyperbolic manner, meshed with Donald’s 
further testimony. In Donald’s words, the crew had been “told that 
the governor of Margaritta meant to press them,” probably, again, 
into South America’s continuing fight for independence from Spain. 
And he further stated that Captain Daniels wished the crew “to enlist 
with him in the service of Venezuela, to which he had become 
attached, that if they did not join him, he would have them put into 
the fort, and fed on bread and water.”76 
On March 24, 1819, crew members John Ferguson and James 
Black led most of the Creola’s crew in a mutiny. John Donald testified 
that “when he was asleep below, one of the crew of the Creola (who 
rose upon the [Irresistible]) came down to his birth [sic], and 
threatened to blow out his brains if he did not join them . . . .”77 And 
John McFadden, the first lieutenant, testified similarly that “fifty men 
armed” “seized all the small arms; threatened to blow out the brains 
of the officer on deck.”78 He further testified that he tried to 
persuade them to give up their mutiny—indeed at one point believing 
he had succeeded in quelling it. However, McFadden stated at trial 
that James Black then “told [the mutineers], they would be strung on 
the beach and hung like dogs . . . .” At that point, according to 
McFadden, “they then sung out, ‘as we have begun, let us go through 
                                                 
because he had been acquitted by the grand jury on his testimony that he had been 
“forced on board the vessel”).  
75 Case of the Irresistible, 6 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Baltimore, MD), June 17, 
1820, at 275 [hereinafter NILES’ WKLY. REG. (June 17, 1820)]. According to John 
Quincy Adams, Black’s tale “was found, upon enquiry, to be wholly without 
foundation.” John Quincy Adams, Diary Entry (June 12, 1820), in MEMOIRS OF 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 72, at 150.   
76 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 392 (testimony of 
John Donald). 
77 Id. (testimony of John Donald).  
78 Id. at 392 (testimony of John McFadden). 
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with it;’ they took all the arms from the Creola; they said all might stay 
who chose; they wished none but volunteers; only four or five 
remained behind . . . .”79 
The witnesses agreed that the mutineers took the Creola only 
as an interim measure. Captain Paul, the Creola’s commander, testified 
that he understood the mutineers “did not intend to injure his vessel, 
but to take possession of the Irresistable. . . .”80 In McFadden’s words, 
the mutineers “said that they were not going to take our brig, but [the 
Irresistible], ours not sailing fast enough . . . .”81 In Stanly’s words, “the 
Irresistable was the strongest vessel; she mounted 16 guns . . . .”82 
In accordance with their plan, the Creola mutineers took two 
smaller boats from their ship, sailed to the Irresistible and led a 
combined attack on and incitement to mutiny aboard that vessel.83 
Upon arrival, the 50 or 60 mutineers met little resistance from the 
Irresistible’s smaller crew of “25 or 30” since most were “gone asleep” 
or “below and drunk” when the 1 a.m. attack began84 or, in the case 
of Captain Daniels, “happening to be on shore.”85 Rather than 
fighting, then, they “drove the men below” before “the boarding 
crew loosed [the Irresistable’s] sails, and stood out to sea.”86 As they 
sailed, according to the Irresistible’s first officer, the attackers 
“overhauled his and Captain Daniels’ trunks for the vessel’s 
commission”87 – apparently hoping for the appearance of legitimacy. 
                                                 
79 Id.. 
80 Id. at 393 (testimony of Captain Paul). 
81 Id. at 392 (testimony of John McFadden). 
82 Id. at 391 (testimony of Samuel Stanly). 
83 Id. at 392 (testimony of John Donald). 
84 Id. at 391-93 (testimonies of Samuel Stanly, Samuel Beaver, and the 
first officer of the Irresistible, Henry Child, who testified that he was below deck 
when the Creola’s crew arrived and that his efforts to defend the ship were quickly 
quashed). 
85 Captain Daniels & Juan B. Arismendi, Proclamation, CITY GAZETTE 
AND COMMERCIAL DAILY ADVERTISER (Charleston, SC), Apr. 24, 1819, at 2. 
86 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 391-92 (testimonies 
of Samuel Stanly and Samuel Beaver). 
87 Id. at 392 (testimony of Henry Child). Apparently, Captain Daniels had 
taken his papers (including the letter of marque) with him to be stored at the 
government house when he first arrived at Margarita. Id. 
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“[F]inding none, Ferguson said he could easily make papers for 
himself.”88 
The next morning, it appeared the decision by the crew of the 
Creola to seize the Irresistible for its speed was a valuable one for them. 
According to Captain Daniels, he was ordered by the governor of 
Margarita to pursue the Irresistible, but the chase proved fruitless.89 
Corroborating that point with detail, John McFadden testified that 
“capt. Daniels’ other vessel tried to pursue the Irresistible next 
morning, then in sight (about twenty miles off) from the mast 
head.”90 Captain Paul of the Creola, further noted that he “went on 
board Captain Daniels’ other vessel, which chased [the Irresistible] 
eight hours in vain.”91 
That same morning, the mutineers “hove to” and clarified 
their plans.92 First, the mutineers appointed the two ringleaders—
John Ferguson and Black—as captain and first lieutenant 
respectively, while Israel Denny was appointed second lieutenant.93 
Second, they sought additional volunteers, allowing those who 
wished to stay to remain on board, and giving one of the ship’s boats 
to those who wished to leave.94 The nature of this offer was the 
subject of some disagreement at trial. On direct examination, for 
instance, Samuel Stanly testified that “[s]uch of the crew of the 
Irresistible as wished to go ashore, were permitted to do so.”95 On 
cross, “in a desultory way,” he stated “that some of the old crew of 
the Irresistible were not willing to join; that when told they might go 
ashore, it was too late, being as much as fifty miles from land . . . .”96 
                                                 
88 Id. at 393.   
89 Id. at 393 (testimony of Captain Daniels). See also Daniels & Arismendi, 
supra note 85. 
90 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 392 (testimony of 
John McFadden). 
91 Id. at 393 (testimony of Captain Daniels). 
92 Id. at 391 (testimony of Samuel Stanly). 
93 Id. at 392 (testimony of John Donald); see also id. at 391 (testimony of 
Samuel Stanly).  Black was later “broken.”  Id. at 391 (testimony of Samuel Stanly).  
94 Id. at 391-93 (testimonies of Samuel Stanly, Samuel Beaver, and Henry 
Child). 
95 Id. at 391. 
96 Id.  
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Samuel Beaver concurred, stating that “eighteen of the crew of the 
Irresistible were set ashore at Margaritta,” but adding “that he did not 
try to get ashore, because he did not wish to be drowned; the boat 
being leaky and full of men and clothes . . . .”97 Nonetheless, at least 
nineteen men were allowed to leave “in a leaky boat.”98 At least 
according to the Irresistible’s original first officer, “had any more been 
willing to go with him, the baggage would have been thrown 
overboard.”99 
By March 29th (i.e., 3 days later), the crew had officially 
become pirates. Back on Margarita, Captain Daniels and Juan 
Bautista Arismendi, governor of the island, had together issued a 
proclamation, which described how “both crews mutinied,” “made 
their escape” and allowed the officers to leave “as adverse to their 
plans of piracy and plunder.” 100 The Proclamation then publicly 
branded the crew as criminals: 
Such iniquitous conduct sets the criminals out of the 
protection of the laws; and to prevent in as much as 
possible, their future depredations, under the pretence 
[sic] of commission to cruize [sic] from the Republic 
of Venezuela—I do hereby declare, that the said brig 
Irresistible has no commission from the Oriental 
Republic of La Plata, since the 24th of this month, 
nor from the Republic of Venezuela; and that he 
ought to be considered as a pirate, and sailing under 
no authority and sanction from any government 
whatever . . . .101 
On board ship—and despite the Proclamation’s rhetoric—
there is some uncertainty as to how much the individual mutineers in 
fact had “plans of piracy and plunder.” According to Irresistible 
crewmember Samuel Beaver, at least some of the crew initially 
                                                 
97 Id. at 392.   
98 Id. at 393 (testimony of Henry Child). 
99 Id. 
100 Daniels & Arismendi, supra note 85 (following the Proclamation, the 
announcement listed by name each of the members of the Irresistible under Daniels’ 
command and of the Creola (Criolla) under Paul’s command). 
101 Id. 
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believed they were legitimate privateers since “[C]apt. Ferguson had 
told them at first, he had a commission; but two days after, he told 
them that he had not.” It was at that point, according to Beaver, that 
“they determined to board every thing.”102 In slightly different terms, 
he testified that the mutineers “said at first that she was coming 
home to Baltimore, but they went a cruising” instead.103 Another 
account blames Black, stating that he “wished to make his fortune” 
out of his “commission as lieutenant in the navy of Buenos 
Ayres . . . . By persuasion and threats, and from the heterogeneous 
mixture of the crew, he prevailed upon a majority of them to give a 
partial assent to his scheme.”104 
Regardless of who cajoled whom, the Irresistible boarded 
somewhere between ten and forty from various nations during its 
cruise,105 rotating among “flags of different nations”106 —such as 
Spain, Buenos Aires, England and Margarita.107 Since the pirates were 
indicted for boarding Spanish, Dutch and American vessels, those 
three ships were the primary focus of the trial, perhaps because the 
prosecution was only able to elicit sufficient detail about those events 
to merit indictments.108 In the incident that formed the basis for the 
first indictment, the crew boarded a Spanish vessel off Cape Antonio, 
where they took $2,300 according to two witnesses109 and $3,700 
according to two others,110 and the money was shared.111 In the 
                                                 
102 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 392 (testimony of 
Samuel Beavers). 
103 Id. 
104 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (June 17, 1820), supra note 75, at 275.  
105 Id. (quoting Black as testifying that they boarded about thirty vessels). 
See also NILES’ WKLY. REG. (June 17, 1820), supra note 5, at 391-92 (testimony of 
Samuel Beavers stating “they boarded 8 or 10, Dutch, French, American, 2 
Spaniards,” and testimony of Samuel Stanly stating the crew “spoke about 30 or 40 
vessels”). 
106 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (June 17, 1820), supra note 75, at 275; see also 
NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 391-92. 
107 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 391-92 
(testimonies of Samuel Stanly, John Donald, and Samuel Beaver). 
108 See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
109 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 391-92 
(testimonies of Samuel Stanly and Samuel Beaver).  
110 Id. at 392 (testimony of John Donald).  See also NILES’ WKLY. REG. 
(June 17, 1820), supra note 75, at 275. 
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incident that formed the basis for the second indictment, the crew 
boarded a Dutch vessel where they took “hampers of gin” (“because 
[they] wanted it”) among other things.112 In the incident that formed 
the basis for the third indictment, the crew boarded an American 
vessel bound for St. Jago, stealing jewelry after a search of the ship.113 
It appears that the group acted with at least some restraint 
during this period since none of the witnesses described any violence 
toward crews aboard the captured ships—beyond, of course, the 
implicit violence inherent in the capture itself.114 According to one 
newspaper account—published before their arrest—the men had 
treated one ship “politely,” had taken only the “eighteen cases of gin” 
from a Dutch vessel, and had invited the captain of a third vessel on 
board.115 Using similar language, a later account turned to Black’s 
testimony to make the following statement in the Irresistible crew’s 
support: 
They boarded about thirty vessels and treated them all 
well, except a truly piratical vessel, whose means of 
annoyance they destroyed . . . a Spanish brig, . . . and 
one American schooner . . . . All else were used in the 
most respectful manner; and, at the request of the 
commander of the brig Commodore Hull, of Boston, 
they convoyed him round a certain point of the island 
of Hayti, where picaroon pirates were exceedingly 
dangerous. They supplied several vessels with 
provisions, and purchased of others what they 
wanted, which they fairly paid for.116 
                                                 
111 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 391-92 (testimony 
of Samuel Stanly and Samuel Beaver). 
112 Id. at 392 (testimony of Samuel Stanly).   
113 Id. at 391 (testimony of Samuel Stanly).  See also Crew of the Irresistible 
(Aug. 5, 1819), supra note 64 (only one defendant, John Chapels, was indicted under 
this count). 
114 See, e.g., NILES’ WKLY. REG. (June 17, 1820), supra note 75, at 275.  See 
generally NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 390-95. 
115 CITY GAZETTE, supra note 73. 
116 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (June 17, 1820), supra note 75, at 275. 
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It appears, however, that Ferguson may at some point have begun to 
lose control of his men. A newspaper published less than a month 
before their capture stated that Ferguson told his men after taking an 
American vessel “to respect American property,” but the crew 
refused to comply.117 Instead, they “with one voice exclaimed, ‘that 
they had risked their lives in taking the brig, that they were in search 
of plunder, and plunder they would have.’”118 
Although the men certainly stole and plundered, moreover, 
the proceeds received by each crewmember appear to have been 
relatively small. The men allegedly took “two dozen finger rings, a 
large number of ear-rings, bracelets, breast-pins and other valuable 
articles” from the American vessel.119 And Samuel Stanly testified that 
he received $29 as his portion of the prize for the plundering, seven 
dollars of that coming from his portion of the proceeds from the sale 
of the jewelry taken from the American vessel.120 
B. The Arrest and Trial of Thomas Smith and His Shipmates 
The fate of the crew of the Irresistible was sealed when, after 
less than three months at sea, they turned toward the Chesapeake 
Bay. The accounts suggest that the crewmembers simply wished to 
come home and believed they could escape serious repercussions. 
According to one account, they first put Black under arrest “and then 
they sailed direct for the Chesapeake, in which they arrived without 
much apprehension that they had done wrong . . . .”121 According to 
Samuel Beaver, “the crew was called together, and divided; those who 
were for going out against went to one part of the vessel, the rest to 
another; the strongest party was for coming in, and the vessel was 
                                                 
117 Piratical Proceeding, CAROLINA GAZETTE (Charleston, SC), June 5, 
1819, at 1. 
118 Id. 
119 Id.  
120 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 392 (testimony of 
Samuel Stanly). 
121 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (June 17, 1820), supra note 75, at 275.  This 
testimony meshes at least partly with that of Samuel Stanley, who stated that Black 
“was 1st lieut. at first, but they broke him.” NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), 
supra note 5, at 391 (testimony of Samuel Stanly). 
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brought into the Patuxent.”122 Once on land, the men attempted to 
disperse but, it appears, were quickly arrested.123  Ultimately, the men 
were charged under different indictments that would be tried by 
different judges and juries in different places.124 
At least seven crewmembers—most notably John Ferguson 
and Israel Denny—remained and were tried in Baltimore.125 On July 
2, 1819, the rest of the Irresistible’s crew members, including Thomas 
Smith, were transported from Baltimore to Richmond, Virginia.126 
Four days later, Smith and sixteen others were charged with piracy 
under the 1819 Act for plundering a Spanish vessel.127 Two men, 
John Alan Steadman and John Waldon, were indicted on a second 
count for piracy against a Dutch vessel since neither man was part of 
                                                 
122 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 392 (testimony of 
Samuel Beaver). See also id. at 390 (editor noting that “they entered the Chesapeake 
bay and generally dispersed themselves”). 
123 Id. at 391 (testimony of Samuel Stanly) (stating that “Commodore 
Daniels sent down and took possession of [the Irresistible.] Witness said the crew 
had abandoned and dispersed.”). 
124 Thomas Smith and sixteen others were sent to Richmond for trial, 
with their appeals eventually reaching the Supreme Court. United States v. Smith, 
18 U.S. 153 (1820). Others from the vessel remained in Baltimore where they were 
tried. On March 3, 1820, John Ferguson and Israel Denny, along with five others 
who had been aboard the Irresistible, were sentenced to death in Baltimore for their 
activities “after a short but impressive address” by the sentencing judge, 
Theodorick Bland, who had been appointed to the federal bench just three months 
earlier. Ferguson and Denny were executed on April 13, 1820, while the others 
were spared. See JOHN THOMAS SCHARF, CHRONICLES OF BALTIMORE (1874). See 
also NILES’ WKLY. REG. (June 17, 1820), supra note 75, at 275; Law Intelligence, 
Chronicle, 18 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Baltimore, MD), Apr. 8, 1820, at 112 [hereinafter 
NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Apr. 8, 1820)] (“Death warrants for the execution of John F 
Ferguson and Israel Denny two of the persons convicted of piracy and now 
confined in Baltimore jail have been received by the marshal of the district of 
Maryland.”). 
125 SCHARF, supra note 124. 
126 CITY GAZETTE AND COMMERCIAL DAILY ADVERTISER, July 10, 
1819, at 3; Letter from John Marshall to Peter V. Daniel (July 2, 1819), in 8 THE 
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 334, 334-35 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1998). 
127 Crew of the Irresistible (Aug. 5, 1819), supra note 64.  See also Smith, 18 
U.S. at 158. One defendant (William Chapels) also was indicted on an additional 
count for piracy against an American vessel under the 1790 Act. Frances Oglesby 
was the only member of the original Irresistible crew to be tried in Virginia.  Crew of 
the Irresistible (Aug. 5, 1819), supra note 64. 
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the crew of the Creola or the Irresistible.128 The nineteen men faced trial 
in the federal circuit court in Richmond.129  Chief Justice Marshall 
was assigned to the fifth circuit (Virginia and North Carolina), so 
with a trial set for Richmond, Marshall would be one of two 
presiding judges joined by St. George Tucker, the district judge for 
the district of Virginia.130 
Over the space of three days, nine separate trials were held 
for the nineteen men facing piracy charges in Virginia. On Monday, 
July 26, Samuel Poole was tried on the first indictment, with all of the 
evidence in the case presented on that day.131 The court sequestered 
the jury overnight.132 The next morning, before sending the jury out 
to deliberate, the court allowed the lawyers in the case to make their 
closing arguments.133 Robert Stanard, the U.S Attorney for Virginia, 
presented an hour-long closing. Stanard analyzed the law and 
evidence in the case and called on the jury to “lend their aid in cutting 
down that system of brigandage which was tarnishing the reputation 
of our country, and demoralizing our seamen.”134 
The two defense attorneys in the case, John Wickham and 
Andrew Stevenson, appeared in turn, arguing for nearly two hours 
between them. They argued that “the words of the act of congress 
were too vague and loose to authorize the jury to dip their hands in 
the blood of a fellow citizen . . . .”135 They turned next to the works 
of the leading international jurists of the day—Grotius Puffendorf, 
Montesquieu and others—finding that they all had failed to provide a 
definition of piracy as a law of nations. Instead, the defense lawyers 
                                                 
128 See Crew of the Irresistible (Aug. 5, 1819), supra note 64 (explaining how 
the two men had served on the crew of the Atlas, where they met up with the 
Irresistible at sea). 
129 See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text (explaining that the men 
appeared in the circuit court rather than district court due to the severity of their 
alleged crimes).  
130 See Chapels, 25 F. Cas. 399.  See also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 
Stat. 73 (1789); Judiciary Act of 1802, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 156 (1802). 
131 See Crew of the Irresistible (Aug. 5, 1819), supra note 64. 
132 See Chapels, 25 F. Cas. 399. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
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argued “the municipal laws of different countries” —and not the law 
of nations—defined piracy.136 Defense counsel made other legal 
arguments before turning to the evidence in the case and arguing, 
inter alia, that the witnesses who had appeared at trial, as accomplices 
who had themselves been imprisoned had ulterior motives in 
presenting their testimony, at least some of which had been 
contradictory.137 
Stanard, the U.S. Attorney, made a lengthy rebuttal argument. 
On the definition of piracy, Stanard contended that, while many 
definitions existed, several commentators, including the Dutch 
scholar Bynkershoeck and the British jurist William Blackstone both 
offered suitable definitions of pirates as villains to be prosecuted and 
enemies of the human race.138 On the evidence, Stanard urged the 
jury to give credit to the testimony of the defendants’ accomplices, 
noting that, without giving effect to such testimony, “the most 
atrocious offences might escape with impunity.”139 Stanard concluded 
by calling on the jury to enforce the law “against brigands who not 
only sailed from its waters to collect plunder but returned to them as 
the scene for its partition, and as a sanctuary where they expected to 
escape the punishment of their crimes.”140 
Justice Marshall and Judge Tucker asked the jury to 
investigate three questions.141 First, had the defendants boarded and 
plundered a Spanish vessel?142 On this point, the court felt that ample 
evidence had been presented, in spite of the problems of accomplice 
testimony, particularly given the corroborative effect of the testimony 
of John Donald, the witness who had been acquitted by the grand 
jury months earlier.143 Second, if such cruising and plundering 
(described by the court as robbery) had occurred, had the defendants 
cruised on the high seas without a commission?144 Here, too, the 
                                                 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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court felt the issue was quite simple and indeed found that “the facts 
given in evidence were totally incompatible with the idea of sailing 
under any authority whatever.”145 
In the event that the jury found that the defendants had 
engaged in robbery while cruising without a commission, the court 
then recommended that the jury find a special verdict on the third 
and closer question: “whether the case came within the act of 
congress.”146 The jury took the court’s instructions and “retired but 
for a few moments.”147 When the members of the jury returned, they 
found Poole guilty on the first two questions and presented a special 
verdict on the third question.148 Immediately thereafter, a new jury 
was impaneled for the purpose of trying the ten others indicted with 
Poole, and the jury returned with identical verdicts.149 
On the following day, Wednesday, July 28, the seven other 
trials began and ended. In three of the trials—involving John Green, 
Thomas Smith, Henry Andy a/k/a Henry Andris, and John Fuller 
(the latter two tried together) —the defendants sought to plead not 
guilty based on duress, but the jury convicted them under the special 
verdict.150 Francis Oglesby, the only original Irresistible crewmember 
tried under the first indictment, was also convicted under the special 
verdict.151 His lawyer had argued that “he was innocent of the plot of 
piracy, and that after the Creola seized upon the Irresistable, he could 
not avail himself of the permission to leave her; the boat being in a 
leaky trim and full of men and baggage.”152 
                                                 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 See Crew of the Irresistible (Aug. 5, 1819), supra note 64. 
151 Id. 
152 Id.  Henry Child’s testimony obviously contradicted this testimony 
since—he at least claimed—that although the boat was leaky and had “much 
baggage in it . . . had any more been willing to go with him, the baggage would have 
been thrown overboard.” See NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 
393. 
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Steadman and Waldon, who were tried on the second 
indictment, were found not guilty. Like them, Thomas Watson had 
belonged to neither the crew of the Creola nor that of the Irresistible, 
and, like them, Watson, “the most unoffending of all the prisoners,” 
was found not guilty.153 Unlike Steadman and Waldon, Watson had 
been charged under all three indictments. However, after he was 
acquitted under the first indictment, the United States attorney 
“ordered a Nolle Prosequi to be entered in his favor, on the other two 
indictments.”154 
Finally, the eighth trial involved William Chapels, who had 
already been convicted the day before on the first indictment. His 
trial on July 28 fell under the third indictment and resulted in an 
acquittal.155 
On July 30, Justice Marshall and Judge Tucker split on the 
legal question raised in the special verdicts.156 As a result of the split 
between the two presiding judges, the case was sent to the Supreme 
Court for a hearing in that same term.157 In a pair of letters to 
Bushrod Washington, his colleague on the Supreme Court, Chief 
Justice Marshall expressed his concern about the enforceability of the 
1819 statute. In the first letter, written on August 3, Marshall briefly 
discussed the recent piracy case he had been involved in, noted that 
the case had been taken to the Supreme Court, and expressed 
“serious doubts of the sufficiency of the law to authorize the 
infliction of punishment in a case of as notorious piracy as ever 
occurred.”158 Nearly three months later, on October 31, 1819, while 
the case was pending before the Supreme Court, Chief Justice 
Marshall wrote another letter to Washington, expanding on his 
concerns and noting that: 
                                                 
153 Crew of the Irresistible (Aug. 5, 1819), supra note 64. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 See John Marshall, United States v. Smith, Charge to Jury, U.S. Circuit 
Court, Virginia (27 July 1819), in VIII THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 370, 372 
n.6 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1995); handwritten docket from Eastern District of 
Virginia in Smith case, available at National Archives. 
157 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.  
158 Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (Aug. 3, 1819), in 
VIII THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 156, at 373. 
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[i]n the trials at Richmond the evidence was perfectly 
clear & the case was unequivocally a case of piracy 
according to the laws of every civilized nation. The 
doubt I entertain is whether there is any such thing as 
Piracy as ‘defined by the law of nations.’ All nations 
punish robbery committed on the high seas by vessels 
not commissioned to make captures yet I doubt 
seriously whether any nation punishes otherwise than 
by force of its own particular statute.159 
In February 1820, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in the 
case. Justice Story, writing for the Court, rejected the contention that 
piracy was not sufficiently defined and reasoned that the definition of 
piracy was understood with sufficient certainty under both Acts.160 
Turning first to the 1790 Act, Justice Story found that the Act’s 
language was wholly appropriate to the extent that it defined piracy 
by reference to common law terms.161 The Court held that “the crime 
is not less clearly ascertained than it would be by using the definitions 
of these terms as they are found in our treatises of the common law” 
and that “[i]n fact, by such a reference, the definitions are necessarily 
included, as much as if they stood in the text of the act.”162 
Next, the Court considered the 1819 Act, which defined 
piracy not by reference to domestic law but rather by reference to the 
law of nations, or international law.163 The Court further concluded 
that the 1819 Act applied to the acts of the sixteen men who had 
been convicted in Richmond.164 The Court concluded that all of the 
                                                 
159 Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (Oct. 31, 1819), in 
VIII THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 156, at 374. 
160 Smith, 18 U.S. at 153, 159-60, 162. 
161 Id. at 160. 
162 Id. 
163 Id.  By contrast, in Palmer, perhaps because only the domestically 
focused 1790 Act had been passed, the Court did not look at the relationship 
between the law of nations and domestic law or turn to external sources of law to 
interpret the nature of piracy. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 610 (1818). 
164 See Smith, 18 U.S. at 160; see also United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. 184 
(1820) (reasoning that “[r]obbery on the seas is considered as an offence within the 
criminal jurisdiction of all nations. It is against all, and punished by all” and 
explaining that “a vessel, by assuming a piratical character, is no longer included in 
 2012 Samuels 1:2 
353 
international law sources demonstrated that under the law of nations, 
the “true definition” of piracy is “robbery upon the sea.”165 That clear 
definition refuted Smith’s primary argument to the Court.166 
Having used international sources to identify a concrete 
definition of piracy, the Court returned to Smith’s arguments about 
the 1790 Act and noted that the law of nations is part of the common 
law167 and that, as a result, the common law definition of piracy 
incorporated the international law understanding that piracy as “an 
offence against the universal law of society, a pirate being deemed an 
enemy of the human race.”168 
                                                 
the description of a foreign vessel . . .”). In Furlong, decided by the Supreme Court 
less than one week after Smith, the Court considered several indictments from the 
circuit courts of Georgia and South Carolina involving prisoners of various 
nationalities and aboard ships cruising under flags both domestic and foreign, 
convicted for acts of piracy. The Court construed the Act of 1790 and found that 
regardless of the nationality of the accused or the national character of the ship 
involved, piratical acts were punishable under the Act. Furlong, 18 U.S. at 193. The 
Court rejected an argument by petitioners that section 5 of the 1819 Act essentially 
repealed section 8 of the 1790 Act. The Court held that both Acts remained 
applicable. Id. The court found that the crew in the case “assumed the character of 
pirates, whereby they lost all claim to national character or protection.” Id. at 205. 
165 Smith, 18 U.S. at 162. 
166 Id.  Almost twenty five years later, in The Malek Adhel, ship-owners 
appealed the seizure of their vessel for alleged violations of the 1819 Act. Among 
their defenses, the ship-owners argued that the “aggressions, restraints, and 
depredations” alleged were not “piratical” within the language of the Act, and they 
argued that, in order to establish piracy the Act required the express intent to steal 
for the sake of gain and for no other purpose. The Supreme Court ruled that such a 
narrow reading of the Act would defeat the object and purpose of the legislation, 
which they believed to be “designed to carry into effect the general law of nations 
on the same subject in a just and appropriate manner.” The Court interpreted 
“piratical” in this context to be general, including any aggression belonging to a 
class of behavior commonly attributed to pirates, regardless of their motives. 
Reaffirming the views expressed in Smith, the Court noted that “a pirate is deemed, 
and properly deemed, hostis humani generis. But why is he so deemed? Because he 
commits hostilities upon the subjects and property of any or all nations, without 
any regard to right or duty, or any pretence of public authority.” The Malek Adhel, 
43 U.S. 210, 221, 232 (1844). 
167 Smith, 18 U.S. at 161. 
168 Id.  The Court also noted that Blackstone considered the common law 
definition of piracy indistinguishable from the law of nations definition. Id. at 162 
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The manner in which modern courts determine what 
constitutes international law can be directly traced to the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Smith169 and its efforts to define piracy under the 
law of nations.170 The Court reasoned that “What the law of nations 
[is on a subject], may be ascertained by consulting the works of 
jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and 
practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and enforcing 
that law.”171 That statement of the sources of international law 
incorporates three of the primary sources of international law 
recognized by tribunals worldwide today as codified in the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice.172 
On May 29, 1820, all sixteen of the prisoners who had been 
convicted nearly a year earlier, appeared before the court to face 
sentencing.173 Each defendant had an opportunity to make remarks 
on why the mandatory sentence should not be imposed on them; 
some made short statements emphasizing their claims of duress, 
while others claimed they had been deceived into thinking the vessel 
was lawfully commissioned, and still others chose not to make any 
remarks at all.174 One of the defendants went so far as to claim that 
John Black had later confessed to giving false testimony.175 After all 
of the defendants had been heard, Judge Tucker pronounced the 
                                                 
(citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 
BOOK 4 ch. 5 (1796)). 
169 Smith, 18 U.S. at 160-61. 
170 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980); Flores 
v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 239 (2d Cir. 2003); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 
395 F.3d 932, 948 (9th Cir. 2002); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238-39 (2d Cir. 
1995). 
171 Smith, 18 U.S. at 160-61. 
172 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993. 
173 John Marshall, United States v. Smith, Sentence, U.S. Circuit Court, 
Virginia (May 29, 1820), in IX THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 44 (Charles F. 
Hobson ed., 1998). 
174 John Marshall, United States v. Smith, Sentence, supra note 173, at 44-
45. 
175 Id. at 45.  That claim was dismissed by Chief Justice Marshall, who 
noted that Black was but one of three witnesses, and indeed had been the witness 
whose testimony was least credible in any event. 
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sentence for all sixteen defendants: they would all be executed on 
June 19, 1820.176 
C. The Aftermath 
At the start of the legal proceedings against the crew of the 
Irresistible, the press routinely spoke sharply about the dangers of 
pirates just like these men. In the words of the Niles’ Weekly Register, 
[w]e have taken some little pains to report these cases 
to the public. The scenes of outrages on the high seas 
which they devolope [sic], belong to the history of the 
times. Such scenes ought to be understood. To 
repress them, should be the wish of every American, 
who values his country, her character and her laws. 
We owe it to the civilized world to arrest such lawless 
outrages, perpetrated by vessels and by crews who 
have their equipment and their sanctuary in our own 
ports.177 
While the Virginia case was pending before the Supreme Court, 
however, John Ferguson and Israel Denny—who had been tried in 
Baltimore—were convicted and sentenced to death.178 
At around this point, at least some public opinion began to 
turn. In early April of 1820, four thousand citizens of Baltimore 
petitioned President Monroe to pardon the two men, and Judge 
Bland—the sentencing Judge—sent a letter “pleading for them.”179 A 
few days later, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams attended a 
                                                 
176 Id. at 45. 
177 NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Aug. 7, 1819), supra note 5, at 395 (quoting THE 
ENQUIRER).  
178 John Quincy Adams, Diary Entry (Apr. 11, 1820), in MEMOIRS OF 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 72, at 63.  See also NILES’ WKLY. REG. (June 17, 
1820), supra note 75, at 275; NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Apr. 8, 1820), supra note 124, at 
112 (“Death warrants for the execution of John F. Ferguson and Israel Denny two 
of the persons convicted of piracy and now confined in Baltimore jail have been 
received by the marshal of the district of Maryland.”).  
179 John Quincy Adams, Diary Entry (April 11, 1820), in MEMOIRS OF 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 72, at 63.  
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meeting during which he, President James Monroe, and several 
members of the cabinet spoke about the possibility of granting the 
pardon.180 Opinions were divided. Adams had three reasons for 
wishing the men to be reprieved. First, he believed the punishment 
for piracy should be “long imprisonment . . . for these and all the 
other cases of simple piracy, and executing only those which had 
been complicated with murder.”181 Second, he believed the 
defendants had been “seduced” into crime by men such as Captain 
Daniels, who had escaped without punishment. Indeed, Adams wrote 
in his diary, “[a]ll the principals and ringleaders in these privateering 
piracies had escaped. They were triumphant against every 
prosecution, while these poor ignorant creatures, the mere mortal 
instruments of their guilt, were to suffer death.”182 Finally, he 
cautioned President Monroe that “a popular movement” against the 
execution might arise in Baltimore and, at the least, “a great odium 
would be excited against the Administration for it.”183 Other cabinet 
members, such as Treasury Secretary William Harris Crawford, 
believed the law provided for execution in the case of piracy, and the 
law should be followed. “If [the law is] not executed in this case, it 
ought not to be executed in any of the others; and the law would 
then be a dead letter. That this was a case of mere piracy without 
murder, made it so much the better as a test for the execution of the 
law.”184 
In this instance, President Monroe sided with Crawford, and 
Ferguson and Denny were executed on April 13, 1820.185 Public 
opinion turned even more decidedly in favor of the pirates, focusing 
on Adams’ first two points—they were justified in attempting to 
escape South America, and they may have robbed, but they did not 
murder. 
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Their acts were piracy, no doubt; but less so than 
many committed which are sanctioned by the laws. 
Treated as they appear to have been—trepanned and 
sold to a foreign service without their consent, they 
stand justified in the seizure of the Artigan vessel 
Irresistible, their enemy, to make their escape from a 
detested servitude; and if they had destroyed those 
who thus treated them, they might still have been 
justified: but they used them with all gentleness 
consistent with the object that they had in view. . . . 
No act of cruelty marked their progress—they were 
pirates, it is true, by their acts, but not so in their 
motives; and there is an immense distinction between 
them and those who are to be hung at Boston for that 
offence [sic] . . . .186 
Given these extenuating circumstances, that same author “trust[ed] 
that mercy will be extended” to the Virginia defendants.187 
Perhaps not surprisingly, almost immediately after the 
sentencing, the executive branch acted to reduce the sentences that 
had been handed down. On the same day that sentence was 
pronounced, most notably, Secretary of State Adams sent a letter to 
U.S. Attorney Stanard, asking him to identify any prisoners who 
should have their sentences reduced and, further, to identify two 
people who deserved execution.188 The Attorney General, William 
Wirt, sent Chief Justice Marshall a similar request.189 Justice Marshall 
replied promptly, sending a letter on May 30 in which he expressed 
reservations about making distinctions among the prisoners but did 
“select & recommend” two—Francis Oglevie and Samuel Pool—as 
possible candidates for “mercy.” In addition, he had asked those in 
charge of the prisoners to rank them “in the order of their behavior 
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IX THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 173, at 46; Letter from John 
Quincy Adams to James Monroe (June 15, 1820), in MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY 
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placing last those who had behaved the worst” on the understanding 
that the bottom two would be executed.190 
Despite having asked for Chief Justice Marshall’s 
recommendations, however, President Monroe’s office had already 
begun to consider even greater clemency—probably at least in part 
out of concern for public opinion.191 Secretary Adams evinced 
concern, for instance, that the two men lowest on the jailer’s list were 
a “man of color” (Peter Johnson) and a “foreigner” (Daniel 
Livingston).192 And he took a meeting with a concerned citizen who 
sought clemency for the sake of the men’s souls. Adams was 
approached on June 11, more specifically, by a Mr. William Fenwick 
of Richmond, who came “to solicit mercy for the convicts at 
Richmond.”193 Although he had a petition “signed by the Judges of 
the Virginia Court of Appeals, and by many other respectable 
persons,” he himself spoke with “much unction” out of a hope that 
at least some of the men had or would turn to religion.194 
He had also a number of other papers, certificates 
from clergymen, and letters, with which he proposed 
to go to the President; among the rest, two letters 
from a young woman at Portland, Maine, sister to 
Samuel G. Poole, expressing very fervent religious 
sentiments. Fenwick himself spoke with much 
unction upon the case, and told me that Poole had 
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become a very earnest preacher of the gospel to his 
brother convicts.195 
So great was Mr. Fenwick’s concern for the prisoners’ souls that, 
upon learning that the death sentences would be commuted, he 
exclaimed, “Do not let those wicked ones know it!” because “they 
had not yet all been awakened to religious impressions.”196 And he 
further expressed concern “that the treatment of the prisoners since 
they were sentenced had been rather more rigorous than was 
necessary, and mentioned particulars very disagreeable to think of: 
such as the men being chained together two and two, and not 
allowed single moments of retirement from the presence of their 
guards.”197 
Even before Fenwick’s arrival, however, President Monroe 
had already expressed an inclination to remit all of the prisoners’ 
sentences and, given the shortage of time, Secretary Adams took it 
upon himself to do just that. As he stated in his diary: 
The day fixed for the execution at Richmond is the 
19th, and, as the post-office arrangement is not yet 
made for conveying letters to the President, there 
would scarcely be time to write to him to receive his 
answer and then to transmit the warrant of reprieve in 
season. I concluded, therefore, to presume upon the 
President’s approbation, and include the whole 
fourteen in the reprieve, which I directed to be made 
out to-morrow.198 
No evidence suggests that the President in any way objected. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Nearly two hundred years after the voyage that led to the 
trials of Thomas Smith and sixteen others in Richmond, the details of 
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the case still resonate. In one sense, the story opens a window into 
the world of nineteenth century privateers. The men who were 
arrested had been part of a network of seafarers who helped colonies 
struggling for independence to gain an advantage over their colonial 
powers. The United States and its regional neighbors relied heavily 
on these men—and those like them—not only in their struggles for 
independence but also to consolidate their power in their early years 
post-independence. But, at the same time, the reliance on private 
individuals to perform essentially military functions of the state left a 
gap of power that could be (and often was) exploited. 
In another sense, the case—about pirates on the high seas 
and international law—exposes numerous aspects of domestic, 
prosaic life in early nineteenth century America. Lurking in the 
background (and sometimes even the foreground) of the case and its 
aftermath are concerns with religion and prisons, the growing 
nation’s still-primitive infrastructure, the structure of courts, public 
opinion, and the role of the press in forming that opinion. The 
ultimate reduction in punishment for the men tried in Richmond 
speaks as much to many of these issues as it does to the acts for 
which the men were initially tried and convicted.199 
In still other ways, the case is notable for myriad other issues, 
revealed often in small details and coincidences. For example, Chief 
Justice Marshall was the trial judge in the case only because of the 
Amendatory Act of 1802, which forced the justices to continue to 
ride circuit. Because Marshall was the trial judge in the case, he had a 
role to play at the trial level—and in the split that allowed the case to 
be heard by the Supreme Court. But, at the same time, because the 
trial was held in the Fifth Circuit, Marshall did not get a chance to 
weigh in officially when the Supreme Court heard and decided the 
case.200 
                                                 
199 It is also notable that virtually all of the defendants were from the 
Creola and the cooperating witnesses were from the Irresistible, demonstrating the 
need for the government to find some help to build a case against the others and 
perhaps a sense that the crew of the Irresistible were viewed as less culpable than the 
men who had boarded their ship in the middle of the night off Margarita. 
200 Not without his lack of trying at least in his letters to Bushrod 
Washington.  See supra notes 158 and 159 and accompanying text. 
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One other notable element of this case rests on reasonable 
inference. As discussed above, Congress acted quickly and decisively 
to “correct” the Supreme Court’s decision in Palmer. Had Marshall’s 
view prevailed on whether the law of nations was sufficient to define 
piracy in domestic law—namely, that it was not sufficient—we can 
thus infer that Congress would have acted with equal haste in 
amending or redrafting the piracy statute. Interestingly, because his 
view did not prevail, Congress to this day has never taken action to 
amend that statute. 
The fact that the 1819 statute remains on the books as the 
federal law on piracy is of more than trivial importance. Less than 
two months apart in 2010, for instance, two district court judges in 
the Eastern District of Virginia faced with essentially identical facts, 
reached two different conclusions about whether the 1819 statute 
covers a failed effort to overtake a vessel on the high seas.201 In both 
cases, Somali pirates unsuccessfully attempted to rob U.S. naval vessels 
disguised in cover of night to appear like merchant ships. In the first 
of the two cases to be decided at the district court level, the court 
concluded that the “clear and authoritative” definition in Smith “of 
piracy as sea robbery” meant that the 1819 statute requires that a 
robbery actually occur.202 Since the alleged pirates had been 
apprehended before boarding the vessel (and as captives who could 
therefore not plunder the vessel in any case), the court concluded 
that they could not be charged with the crime of piracy under the 
statute.203 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit, interpreting Smith and the 
1819 statute, weighed in and decided that the law of nations had 
evolved over time and did cover violent attacks on the high seas.204 
                                                 
201 See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. Va. 2010); 
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204 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 642 (holding attempted piracy was piracy); 
Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 554, vacated by 680 F.3d 374 (holding, before Fourth Circuit 
ruling, that attempted piracy was not piracy). 
 2012 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 1:2 
362 
Through the years, federal courts have regularly returned to 
Smith, not only for its support of the law of nations as a source of law 
in domestic law but also for its approach to ascertaining international 
law. At the end of the day, from a lawmaking perspective, the 
ultimate importance of Smith is its validation of the use of the law of 
nations to create binding domestic law. But from a legal and 
historical perspective, the case has—somewhat paradoxically—a 
perhaps equally great importance for the light it sheds on the purely 
domestic concerns of a still-struggling, still-growing nation. 
 
